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1. Introduction 
 
This contribution is about hybrid regulation from a legal design perspective. 
Applying a legal design perspective is about ensuring and optimizing the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of legal regulatory instruments (in bringing about 
their sought outcomes) in a methodical way. Hybridity of regulation is a 
characteristic of forms of (combinations of) regulatory instruments based on a 
mix of origins. My core assumption is, that such origins, feature pure forms, 
characteristic of regulation being fully consistent with a particular ideal type 
institutional environment. These ideal types purport standard patterns of 
behaviour with optimal internal legitimacy and effectiveness.  
 
Take the example of private law tendering and contracting on services of public 
interests (e.g. health care), involving both public and private parties. The above 
aspiration of legal design would call for applying a method (as a well-considered 
way of making a design), which takes into account that the mixed origins of 
such regulation will come with various particular demands and constraints as 
regards factors of legitimacy and effectiveness. In this example (i.e. contracting 
on matters of public interest) the origins of public and private law would require 
(among other issues) taking into account third-party interests while achieving 
mutual agreement between contracting parties. 
 
Not all regulation presents itself in the form of legal acts or otherwise intended 
occurrence of legal effects, but when it does, legal design guidelines, relevant to 
choosing and moulding specific instances of regulatory instruments, need to 
build upon a proper understanding of their characteristics and conditions. These 
form the considerations, essential to a regulatory instrument’s success. The legal 
design, for instance, of regulation by tradable emission allowances will build 
upon design considerations (such as of the property concept), which differ from 
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those relevant to, for example, regulating legal frames for public-private 
organizations (in which the concept of legal personality will feature).  
It is the assumption of this contribution, that apart from characteristics of the 
internal norm structure of regulation (concerning norm subject, norm object, 
norm operator and norm condition), legal design of regulation must also reflect 
and provide guidelines on meeting conditions for external norm validity. Such 
external validity is about if, how and to what extent effectiveness and legitimacy 
of regulation is properly underpinned (and safeguarded) given the relevant 
institutional environment. Public law regulation regarding government 
interventions on safeguarding health and safety, and private law regulation 
concerning fairness of market transactions, will each call upon their own and 
distinct normative logic as regards their legitimacy and effectiveness. A 
‘normative alignment’ is at stake here (e.g. government regulation under the rule 
of law; regulation by contracts under commutative justice), which has bearing 
both on the power to legally regulate and the norms of conduct regarding 
procedure and substance of regulation – which concern both effectiveness and 
legitimacy. On a systemic level, setting aside actors’ whims, normative 
alignment is (and so effectiveness and legitimacy are) ensured when a regulatory 
type’s core characteristics are consistent with the institutional environment (e.g. 
contracts in markets; administrative acts in government). When hybridity (of 
origins) is in play, such alignment is (at least) uncertain, and consequently the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of such regulatory acts may be at stake. 
 
Consequently, understanding hybrid regulation is a logical step in answering 
legal design challenges of regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy. In this 
contribution the notion of ideal types of institutional environments and 
accompanying institutional control systems is used to provide a context for 
mapping regulatory hybridity. This mapping can be helpful in identifying types 
of hybrid regulation as a step towards formulating design guidelines relevant to 
achieving the necessary external validity, to secure their effectiveness and 
legitimacy through normative alignment.  
 
To this end our narrative commences with defining regulation (see Para. 2). Not 
only is this about determining core characteristics, but also about understanding 
that in the last four decades (as we experienced the shift from government to 
governance)1 regulation as a concept has outgrown its traditional pure form of 
unilateral, top-down, public law, government steering of citizens’ behaviour –
thus giving cause to more closely look at other pure, but also at hybrid forms of 
regulation. The next step (in Para. 3) is to briefly explain the idea behind legal 
                                                        
1
  See, amongst others R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance, Buckingham, Open 
University Press, 1997. 
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design and its focus. With that notion in mind, the actual mapping of pure and 
hybrid forms of regulation will take place (in Para. 4). In conclusion (presented 
in Paragraph 5) some notes are made on how our insight into pure and especially 
hybrid forms may be taken aboard in our legal design efforts. 
 
2. Regulation 
2.1  Control over or Attempted Alteration of Behaviour: Selznick & Black 
In this contribution the term regulation covers a broader area than defined by 
Philip Selznick,2 when he spoke of “sustained and focused control exercised by 
a public agency over activities that are valued by a community.”  
 
Especially the limitation to ‘public agencies’ – and consequently to a public 
interest approach (of community interests) – does not do justice to the present 
day fact that so many (possible) acts by private persons and organizations are 
‘controlled’, or at least significantly influenced, by ‘private agents’, such as 
public service enterprises, multinational companies, and public interest NGO’s. 
 
The definition provided by Julia Black3 seems more appropriate to capture such 
a broader scope, in keeping with the shift from government to governance, away 
from a primacy of government (or ‘public agencies’) over regulation:  
 
the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behavior of 
others according to standards or goals with the intention of 
producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which 
may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-
gathering and behavior-modification. 
 
The definition explicitly includes the element of intent (of ‘producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes’), which in Selznick’s definition was implicit to 
the agenda of the public agency involved, as a consequence to its ‘task’, 
‘mission’ or ‘objective’. Intent or wilfulness separates regulation from 
accidental influence exerted on the behaviour of others (e.g. when regulatees 
adjust their behaviour due to misunderstanding a politician’s remark about 
                                                        
2
 P. Selznick, Focusing Organizational Research on Regulation, in R. Noll (Ed.), 
Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp 
363-364. 
3
  J. Black, ‘Critical reflections on regulation’, 27 Australian journal of legal philosophy 
(2002), pp. 1-35, and J. Black, What is Regulatory Innovation?, in J. Black, M. Lodge & 
M. Thatcher (Eds.), Regulatory Innovation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2005, p. 11. 
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changing a tax deduction system). Intent expresses a functional objective: a 
change of behaviour is sought (through adherence of others to certain standards 
or goals), as a means to particular outcomes (e.g. a subsidy to impact consumer 
behaviour towards favouring use of sustainable energy). Only as an intentional 
undertaking does it make sense to support regulation by a design approach.4 
 
In all, to be labelled as regulation, the ‘attempt’ at altering behaviour may be 
understood to involve three separate elements: intent, focus and sustenance. Not 
only should we separate regulation, as intentional attempt, from accident, but 
also, as focused attempt, from (intentional and sustained, but) ‘dim’ attempts at 
altering behaviour. Take, for instance, a broadly phrased appeal calling for less 
violence in entertainment games. Likewise, as sustained attempt, regulation 
should not be confused with (intentional and focused, but) ‘incidental’ (ad hoc 
or discontinuous) attempts at altering behaviour. Take, for instance, a ban on 
smoking tobacco in public places being withdrawn on the day of its entry into 
force, without any enforcement action taken. In addition to intent, the elements 
of focus and sustenance underscore the benefits of applying a design approach to 
regulation. 
 
Alternative to Selznick’s ‘control over activities’, Black refers to ‘mechanisms 
of standard-setting, information-gathering and behavior-modification’. Thus the 
scope of regulation seems, on the one hand, less limited (as ‘control’ suggests 
unilateralism), and on the other hand, more specified (as ‘control’ is a rather 
abstract term). In any case, this specification elucidates how regulation relates to 
behaviour: prescriptively, descriptively and assertively. It does so without 
suggesting exclusiveness (to other means or mechanisms), or that all of these 
mechanisms need always be used together. Still, it seems logical that 
enforcement (as an assertive form of behaviour modification) builds upon 
monitoring (as a descriptive form of information-gathering), which in turn 
builds upon standard setting (as a prescriptive form of projecting behaviour).5 
Without setting standards, what is there to monitor or enforce with regulatory 
relevance?  
  
                                                        
4
  Consider also the importance of ‘intent’ to bring about ‘legal effects’ as a necessary 
element of a ‘legal act’ – as opposed to legal effects following from the a mere legal fact 
(occurring without intent or regardless of its occurrence upon intent – lawful or 
unlawful).  
5
  At which the element of ‘prescription’ calls for a (basic) norm operator (‘shall’ or ‘may’) 
relating to a mode of behaviour (‘do’ or ‘not do’ X – X referring to an activity). I am 
assuming here that standard setting amounts to more (especially prescriptively) than 
merely expressing a possible standard for definition (types) and measuring of something 
(a (characteristic of a) thing, situation or activity), or applying a relevant method or mode 
of operation (as in service, production, management etc.). 
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At the same time it seems that to merely set standards, without monitoring or 
enforcement, hardly meets the criterion of a ‘sustained attempt to alter 
behaviour’ – even under regulation by providing information.6 In this 
contribution, the use of the term ‘regulation’ will refer to standard setting only, 
unless otherwise specified. 
 
As the primacy of government no longer dominates the definition of regulation, 
the lack of reference to an element of societal interest (in Selznick’s definition: 
‘activities valued by a community’) seems a logical consequence. Take the 
example of a supermarket chain, which introduces a new label to create a niche 
market and consequently requires of its subcontractors (and sub-subcontractors 
etc.) to apply certain standards of production. While, presumably, merely 
seeking to serve the private interest of this supermarket chain (at making a 
profit), this course of action may (also) be considered as a type of attempt at 
altering behaviour of (sub-)subcontractors, which fits all elements of Black’s 
definition of regulation (especially when the label is supported by a certification 
and auditing arrangement). Clearly, as we move away from the confinement to 
government regulation, we find that we enter a realm which not only introduces 
private regulators, but also private regulators merely regulating for their own 
private interests, and – perhaps ironically – also doing so by means that (almost) 
equate with traditional command and control by governments. Meanwhile, 
although Black’s definition does not presuppose “particular justifications or 
explanations for why regulation occurs”,7 it does hold at its core the notion that 
regulation is about ‘collective problem-solving’ with a scope that reaches 
beyond the confines of the state.8 The usefulness of a legal design perspective 
remains, as regulators outside government will also want their regulations to be 
(accepted as) legitimate and effective (as to their intended outcomes).  
2.2 A Designed Instrument – Brownsword & Somsen 
 
In as much as Black’s definition is leading in this contribution, the specific (and 
concise) wording of Brownsword & Somsen’s9 definition of regulation requires 
consideration:  
  
                                                        
6
  Without assuming that monitoring or enforcement necessarily involves unilateral 
interventions; some persistence to the effect of calling for or organizing compliance (if 
only by informing) seems, however, logically included.  
7
  Black, supra, 2005, p. 11. 
8
  Id. and supra, 2002. 
9
  R. Brownsword & H. Somsen, ‘Law, innovation and technology: before we fast forward 
– a forum for debate’, Law, Innovation and Technology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, p. 8. 
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Any instrument (legal or non-legal in its character, 
governmental or non-governmental in its source, direct or 
indirect in its operation, and so on) that is designed to 
channel behavior. 
 
First of all, this definition moves away from regulation as an activity (‘to 
regulate’), and focuses on its characteristics per se. In Black’s definition these 
characteristics amount to: standard setting, monitoring and enforcement; altering 
behaviour to accord with standards or goals, to produce certain outcomes. 
Brownsword & Somsen summarize the notion of regulatory mechanisms (such 
as standard setting etc.) by reference to the use of an(y) ‘instrument’. They do 
not provide a particular definition of the term ‘instrument’, but their use of the 
term in the context of ‘coding’ provides a connotation especially relevant to 
design considerations.10 Coding for action is about the ‘regulatory environment’ 
(as a context) of this action, providing signals on whether particular acts are 
viewed positively, neutrally or negatively, praised or criticized, incentivized or 
disincentivized, whether they are permitted, required, prohibited, or even 
possible or impossible.11 Various signals may apply in any given situation of an 
actor (the ‘regulatee’ – the ‘other’ in Black’s definition) considering an action 
(including to not act).  
 
Brownsword & Somsen regard the regulatory environment as a product of 
intentional design, building upon self-conscious decisions of regulators to 
provide (a range of) coding signals,12 with the aim of channelling behaviour – 
i.e. with a purpose. From this a regulator’s strategic choice should be to engage 
with regulatees’ ‘practical reason’ (i.e. their moral and non-moral reasons for 
action) to shape their conduct. Thus regulatory coding becomes a ‘social fact’, 
which “variously constrains or supports what they otherwise wish to do.” These 
codes either have normative elements (i.e. ought or ought not – expressed as 
(absence of) a right to (not) act, or as an act being prudential as regards their 
self-interest in it) or non-normative elements (i.e. can or cannot – expressed as 
the possibility or impossibility to perform an act).13 
  
Coding through signals which hold such elements is geared to ‘channelling of 
conduct’, broadly speaking either by constraining or enabling (such as, in 
normative-legal coding, tort(s) law being a constraint, and property law (mostly) 
                                                        
10
  Other than that we should use standard dictionaries, such as Merrian-Webster (online): 
“Instrument – a means whereby something is achieved, performed, or furthered.” 
(available at <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/instrument>). 
11
  Supra, note 9, p. 4. 
12
 Supra, note 9, p. 5. 
13
  Supra, note 9, p. 6. 
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enabling. The basic modes of channelling follow a particular ‘ethical stance’ as 
regards a particular course of action (on the occasion of its first identification as 
object of regulation).14  
Basic modes of channelling will vary with the choice of regulatory modes, each 
involving their own particular instruments and range. At this, Brownsword and 
Somsen refer to Lessig’s distinction between four ‘modalities of regulation’,15 
labelled according to their characteristic kind of constraints, as: law 
(underpinned by legal force and accompanying threat of punishment), social 
norms (underpinned by decentralized punishments, by a community), markets 
(underpinned by price constraints), and architecture (underpinned by physical 
constraints as sanctions). In the words of Brownsword & Somsen, instruments 
as instances of such modes are relevant so long as they shape conduct (of 
regulatees) “[…] by engaging some dimension of their practical reason”.16 
 
As we will see in the below, Murray and Scott17 have taken up on Lessig’s 
approach and provided systemic amendments which are especially relevant to 
the ‘purity’ of concepts and thus to the analysis and understanding of hybrids. 
 
Brownsword & Somsen emphasize that in their definition of regulation, the 
regulatory environment probably does not exist. Instead, at any given time or 
place, there will be different classes of regulators, simultaneously contributing to 
the regulatory environment, sometimes rivalling in their attempts at channelling 
particular types of conduct. As they put it: “[…] individuals produce private 
decentralized norms, institutions produce centralized private norms, and states 
produce public-centralized laws and regulations.”18 Not only does this make for 
a multi-actor regulatory environment, but often (as in the EU, but generally also 
in states) also for a multi-level regulatory environment – which reflects the 
terminology of multi-actor and multi-level governance. In determining design-
                                                        
14
  Brownsword & Somsen, supra, pp. 13-15. R. Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the 
Technological Revolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 19. To elaborate is 
tempting, but reaches beyond the scope of this contribution. Cf. also, C. Harlow & R. 
Rawlings, Law and Administration, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1997 (reprint 2006) and editions 2009 and 2012. 
15
  Supra, note 9, p. 9, n. 14; L. Lessig, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace, New York, 
Basic Books, 1999, Chapter 7, and L. Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw 
Might Teach’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 113, No. 2, 1999, pp. 501-546, especially pp. 
506-14.  
16
  Id., p. 6. 
17
  A. Murray & C. Scott, ‘Controlling the New Media: Hybrid responses to new Forms of 
Power’, The Modern Law Review, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2002, pp. 491-516, esp. p. 502. 
18
  Id, p. 8. We will leave aside why Brownsword & Somsen choose to speak of private 
norms and of public laws and regulations. 
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guidelines, this complexity of modern day regulatory governance needs to be 
well-considered. 
2.3 Plurality of Definitions: Levi-Faur 
 
The complex state of regulatory governance is also reflected in David Levi-
Faur’s statement that “[…] we are all immersed in the regulatory game.” 19 Levi-
Faur emphasizes that, apart from scholarly differences, the variation in 
definitions of regulation can be understood as a result of conceptualizing 
regulation either from a state-centred or a society-centred perspective.20 Clearly, 
in the vein of Selznick’s definition, a state-centred approach will lead to a 
definition, which stipulates the important relation between regulation and the 
existence of an administrative agency (especially a public agency). Quite 
opposite, we find a society-centred conceptualization, which includes “all 
mechanisms of social control”21 ( i.e. ‘hard’ and ‘soft’) and considers as 
regulatory, “anything producing effects on behavior”, that is, including 
unintentional norm development. In this approach, regulation also encompasses 
civil-to-civil, civil-to-government, civil-to-business, business-to-government 
and business-to-business regulatory relations, which not only de-centre from the 
state, but (in part) also from institutionalized forms of self-regulation. Levi-Faur 
cites Scott’s (2001) definition of regulation as expressive of this very open 
approach:  
any process or set of processes by which norms are 
established, the behavior of those subject to the norms 
monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there 
are mechanisms for holding the behavior of regulated actors 
within acceptable limits of the regime.22 
 
Generally, an iteration of standard setting, monitoring and enforcement will 
reflect some intent with some regulator. In any case, given this contribution’s 
prime objective (‘mapping hybridity as guidance for design’), I do not propose 
to drop ‘intentionality’ as an attribute of regulation – and so regulation will be 
understood as such hereafter). Intentionality is an indispensible element of 
regulation if we are to regard it as an object of design, geared to channel 
behaviour. Given the above definitions of Selznick (especially “control 
exercised by an agency”), Black (esp. “attempt […] with the intention of 
producing […] outcomes’) and Brownsword & Somsen (“not the product of 
                                                        
19
  D. Levi-Faur (Ed.) Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, Cheltenham UK, Edward 
Elgar, 2011, p. 7. 
20
  Id., p. 3. 
21
  Id., p. 6. 
22
  Id. 
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unintentional design”) I believe a definition or categorization, which builds on 
the notion of intent of design (as I consider ‘intentional design’ a pleonasm), 
stands in good company.  
 
Finally, Levi-Faur himself, while emphasizing the plurality of definitions (given 
scholarly and other backgrounds or analytical motives), prefers a rather strict 
definition:  
 
[the ex-ante] bureaucratic legalization of prescriptive rules 
and the monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, 
business, and political actors on other social, business, and 
political actors. (As long as these rules are not formulated 
directly by the legislature (primary law) or the courts.).23  
 
An important motive behind his choice of definition is that it focuses attention to 
the role of (sets of) actors in the regulatory process and thus emphasizes the 
importance of ‘hybridity’ in regulation (and, for that matter, governance) of 
human or societal affairs. Clearly, this is an approach and motive most relevant 
to the aim of this contribution.24 Meanwhile, what we need to take from the 
definition is that, although it is not meant to suggest any substantive function of 
regulation, clearly it is based on a categorization, which builds on regulators 
acting with intent.  
2.4 This Contribution’s Take 
 
In this contribution I will use the term regulation as defined by Brownsword & 
Somsen (‘[a]ny instrument designed to channel behavior’), while assuming that 
this definition particularly regards intentional, focused and sustained standard 
setting (apart from monitoring and enforcing – as in Black’s definition), and that 
it involves social, business and political actors both as regulators and regulatees 
(as in Levi-Faur’s definition). I see no need to exclude legislation, but will 
exclude court decisions per se. Further, as my interest lies with the legal 
appraisal of the notion of hybridity, from a design standpoint, I only include 
                                                        
23
  Id. 
24
  Yet another aspect of Levi Faur’s definition coincides with Brownsword’s & Somsen’s 
remark of there not being just one/the regulatory environment, but various environments 
at the same time. Levi-Faur’s approach to this (alongside others) is that of Regulatory 
Capitalism, which refers to how state deregulation to liberalize markets is accompanied 
by more non-state regulation: a shift from the Regulatory State to Regulatory Capitalism, 
which in turn may also be taken to refer to a state of competition between regulation 
from different (multi-)actor and (multi-) level origins. See D. Levi-Faur, ‘David, The 
Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, Annals’, AAAPSS, 598, March 2005, pp. 12-
32. 
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those types of regulation, with which design involves a choice of a per se legal 
form related to their regulatory function, which is to (somehow) channel 
behaviour. 
Without going into detail on this exclusion, one can image that to regulate in 
terms of a publicity campaign – whether by a public or a private regulator – is of 
interest only if the choice of form of campaigning calls for a choice of legal 
form. This would leave out publicity generated by merely making information 
known to the public or target group by existing channels (such as TV & radio, 
internet sites, leaflets, newspapers and billboards). The following remarks on the 
concept of design – preceding an analysis of hybridity of regulation – will 
hopefully provide further clarification. 
3. Design 
3.1 Object of Design? 
 
In the phrase “Any instrument designed to channel behavior”, I take the verb 
‘designed’ to refer to a designed type of instrument to channel behaviour, rather 
than the instrument as a (prescribed) design of behaviour (which is channelled 
according to the design). The latter interpretation would call for a focus on the 
actual use of a particular instrument, in its capacity of providing a guideline, 
model or pattern for subsequent norm-conform behaviour by regulatees. In this 
contribution, however, we are looking at instruments, especially of a hybrid 
nature, as ‘ground work’ towards the formulation of related design guidelines. 
 
This approach of the design of types of regulatory instruments is in keeping with 
the common-sense notion of a design as an abstract model, not the real thing (a 
piece of regulation in practice), but, as Ruiter has put it, “[…] an outline of 
something that does not yet exist, but is considered to be realizable on the basis 
of the outline”. 25  
 
 
                                                        
25
  This definition does not rule out the possibility that the outline is used only once – to 
accordingly create only one ‘something’ (as in the design of a unique house), although, 
dependent on specifications (and dependent on property rights in the design), a 
repeatable creation will often be either foreseen or possible. Unless stated otherwise, 
references in this contribution to D.W.P. Ruiter, relate to work in progress at Twente 
University, concerning Legal Design Methodology. 
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The ‘outline’ itself is an idea, which projects a yet inexistent object or artefact, 
designed to fulfil its ascribed function and to be as such created or produced in 
actual fact – e.g. a car to drive, a dress to wear, a chair to sit on, a rule to be 
adhered to.26  
Take the example of somebody saying: “This car is designed by Pininfarina!” 
This is not to suggest Pininfarina’s active involvement in the production of this 
particular instance of a car (the ‘actual car’), but it refers to his idea behind it. 
This idea is projected by an ‘outline’, often a depiction or representation, 
perhaps by pattern, image or model, possibly accompanied by an instruction, as 
a ‘user manual’.27 This outline is geared to contribute to making forms, which 
may lead to some functional end-result and in that sense, with Ruiter, we may 
view design as “the projection of a type of artefacts with a function determining 
their form.” Pininfarina’s idea as a projection of an artefact in the form of a type 
of car, is about producing actual, physical instances of this type of artefact (i.e. 
many such cars). Here, by analogy, we take regulatory artefacts as intangible 
objects produced through design; types of regulatory instruments with a form 
suitable to perform the intended regulatory function, such as the form of a legal 
prohibition, which channels behaviour in that regulatees ‘shall not do x’ (i.e. 
refrain from performing act x). In this example, ‘channelling’ is indicative of 
how the ‘form follows function’ relationship fits the terminology used by 
Brownsword & Somsen. In their view, regulatory instruments are designed to 
channel behaviour through (forms of) coding (as providing signals, normative or 
non-normative, which relate to regulatees’ practical reason). Proper design of 
regulatory forms of coding should ensure that these forms will (effectively and 
legitimately), once produced according to the design, perform their function of 
channelling behaviour. The design provides the outline for repeatedly producing 
regulatory instruments of a certain type, suitable to functional specifics, which 
accommodate application in various regulatory environments. For example, with 
legal significance, one can think of the design de- and prescriptively of how to 
set up the instrument of tradable (property) rights or of service contracts; designs 
to be used as outlines according to which instances of such instruments can in 
practice be introduced (or changed or withdrawn).  
 
                                                        
26
  With all kinds of functional specifications: a car for open driving, for transport of 
persons or goods; a dress for a wedding, for work, for dancing; a chair for by a table, to 
relax in, to work from, to watch a movie in, to use while driving a car; a rule to empower 
(arrive at a contract, grant a permit) or to channel behaviour prohibitively, permissively, 
and/or facilitatively. 
27
  One can image that with some artefacts the design as image, provides sufficient 
information for subsequent production – certainly to the trained eye. One could say that 
in such cases the design is indeed intended for a ‘copy-paste’ practice; a practice that the 
art of designing is actually meant to take distance from.  
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3.2 Design versus Making of Instruments 
 
So, first there is design of regulatory instruments and then the actual making of 
instruments, leading to instances of instruments made. Compare the design of 
tradable public rights versus the de facto introduction of such rights in a 
particular jurisdiction – as of parking licences in a major city. As was explained 
in the above, we focus on the design of the instrument, not on the design of 
behaviour in particular circumstances – so, we need to be clear on this 
distinction.  
 
We saw in the above (opening sentences of Para. 3.1), that instances of actual 
regulatory instruments deployed, may provide a, let us say, de facto design for 
norm-conform behaviour. That is, if and when it holds an abstract norm 
condition, making the norm applicable to an abstract category of cases or 
situations, as ‘repeatable legal facts’ (e.g. “an establishment which is likely to 
cause environmental harm, must have a permit”) – as opposed to a concrete case 
or situation, as a ‘unique legal fact’ (e.g. on King Willem Alexander’s royal 
inauguration, it is prohibited to demonstrate in Amsterdam’s city centre). In 
deployment in practice (and in its design outline), abstract and concrete 
conditionality will be matched with either general or individual norm 
subjectivity. General norm subjectivity refers to an open class of regulatees, as 
in “all car-drivers are not allowed to drive their car in Amsterdam city centre”, 
at any day or only on the day of the royal inauguration (i.e. either with abstract 
or concrete conditionality). Individual norm subjectivity refers to an individual 
or a closed group of regulatees, as in “the prince royal of Oranje or all present 
members of the House of Oranje shall sit front row”, always or only at the royal 
inauguration (i.e. either with concrete or abstract conditionality).28 
Abstract deployment of norms in practice (both generally or individually) may 
be regarded as de facto design as normative guidance towards repeated factual 
behaviour. 
 
Again let us look at the analogy with physical objects of design, such as the 
design of a dress, as an idea (captured in a pattern), making the actual dress 
(according to the design) and the actual dress as a result thereof. One may argue 
that the actual dress made, is in fact (also) a design for behaviour of the 
person(s) wearing the dress. This is relevant in as much as a dress is suitable 
only for specific behaviour (e.g. for dancing, wedding, sports, gardening, 
                                                        
28
  See, amongst others D.W.P. Ruiter, Institutional Legal Facts, Legal Powers and their 
Effects, Dordrecht, 1993, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 161-. The example of the 
royal inauguration is based upon (not taken from) the events in the Netherlands on April 
30, 2013. 
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swimming et cetera), and whether this is merely accidental or indeed intended 
use by enabling or constraining design of behaviour. If so, we are faced with an 
example of the concept of the regulatory mode of architecture (named in the 
above – see Paragraph 2.2). In regulation by architecture, behaviour is 
intentionally channelled by physical conditions of a particular functionality, 
such as – perhaps more illustrative, a road, which is not just accidentally bumpy 
or curved, but intentionally furnished with a speed ramp or traffic corridor), as a 
matter of channelling behaviour.29 A particular ramp or corridor in a road will, 
at its particular place, design the behaviour of drivers in how they move their car 
over and/or through (as to speed, direction etc.).  
Given our choice of focus, we consider such regulation, as we do other types of 
regulation, only in terms of its design as a particular instrument type (as in what 
is the make-up of a ramp, so that its form will fulfil its function of speed 
reduction) – to be brought about, in factual instances, by following applicable 
design instructions.3031 This exclusion of de facto design, should not be taken to 
also preclude types of regulatory instruments (other than architecture and 
especially found in statutory legislation) which, as objects of legal design, 
within themselves hold a legal design, often with accompanying design-
guidelines (often related to one or more power conferring norms) for performing 
legal acts – such as contracts or administrative acts.  
 
To clarify the difference, we need to carefully separate the following elements, 
as sequential steps (each indicated with a number), which will be presented 
along a particular example: given a concern for a particular interest (say, safety 
within bars and restaurants), some agent (say, the association of municipalities), 
introduces a legal design in the form of a non-binding model bylaw for 
municipalities (1. such as in the form of a bylaw but with explanations; sent to 
its members), which may then be used by municipalities to introduce instances 
                                                        
29
  Brownsword & Somsen, supra, p. 5, on the place of a door in a room and possible 
regulatory intent – e.g. is it merely because construction-wise this is the only suitable 
place, or does it involve a choice regarding how future users of the room are to 
(preferably) move about in the building. 
30
  Consider how Murray and Scott, supra, p. 501, emphasize that, “[…] the standard setting 
element of architecture is not self-executing, but is by definition, designed by human 
hands.” They go on to point out that as to monitoring and enforcing architecture can, but 
not necessarily is, self-executing. 
31
 I will not go into the debate on whether ‘de facto design’ (of behaviour), brought about 
by an actual (de facto) instance of a designed type of regulatory instrument, can only 
really be considered design if its intent to channel behaviour manifests by in situ 
behavioural choices reaching beyond merely prescribing the regulatory blue-print to the 
given ‘situation’ – in other words only if it creates behavioural consequences which are 
not implicit or inherent to the type alone. This also relates to the before last footnote – if 
a dress is ready-made or tailor-made, taking a particular person’s preferences into 
account (within or outside the given design guidelines […]). 
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of such a bylaw (2. as a matter of exercising a hitherto legal competence), and 
within these bylaws there may be a design in the form of a prescribed model 
permit (3. regarding safety in bars and restaurants), which can legally be applied 
by municipal authorities to issue permits (4. for individual bars and restaurants), 
prescribing norms with abstract conditionality (5. such as safety standards 
applicable when preparing hot foodstuff), whereupon permit holders perform 
norm conform behaviour (6. ideally, by applying the prescribed behaviour).  
 
From this contribution’s perspective I draw a line between element 4 and 5, thus 
including the ‘prescribed’ design within a legal act, but excluding the ‘de facto’ 
design of mere factual behaviour. Thus, both the regulatory instruments (of no. 
2) providing such prescribed designs (no. 3, of legal acts of no. 4) and the non-
binding/proto designs (of no. 1) of such instruments (of no. 2) and instruments 
(as of no. 4), which do not hold prescribed designs, are part of our analysis. 
Considering our scope, looking at hybrid regulation, we should be aware that a 
piece of public law regulation (such as a bylaw – such as the above no. 2), may 
hold a (no. 3) prescribed legal design, as a binding guideline for performing 
private law legal acts (no. 4). As we will see later, hybridity can involve far 
more complicated mixes of origins than the public-private dichotomy and 
consequently, even greater care is required. For now, a graphic representation 
may help to keep track of the above distinctions.  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Sequential Elements of Legal Design 
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3.3 Evolution or Design? 
 
In design we try to distance ourselves from ‘mean and lean’, ‘copy-paste’ 
strategies of producing regulations – applying mimesis: using other regulatory 
instruments, on mere prima facie ‘form-function’ reflection, while making only 
minor amendments, concerning some specificities. Legal practise is undoubtedly 
full of instances where existing contracts, permits, ordinances, presumed similar 
to the one desired in a novel situation, are used to make that new instance.32 
Making proper designs, however, calls for a proper ‘method of design’. For it is 
assumed here, that (proper) design holds a better promise of facing future 
regulatory challenges than mere regulatory evolution. Such evolution is 
understood as a chronology of incremental regulatory changes or developments, 
through successive instances of regulation.33 These evolutionary changes and 
developments are accidental in that they do only in retrospect reveal a novel 
idea of a function served by a particular type of regulation, which may 
subsequently be intentionally enjoyed and deployed to that end. Much as in 
human existence, evolution can create beautiful accidents, or rather incidents (of 
instances of) regulation. It is, for instance, possible to arrive at systems of 
tradable public law allowances, other than by legislative scheme, merely on the 
conjunction of various incidents of regulation (including court decisions adding 
rules or providing novel interpretations). The thing is, we have little to no ex 
ante knowledge on the likelihood that regulatory evolution will always provide 
the needed instruments, timely and with (desired and ‘proven’) functionality, 
securing effectiveness and legitimacy.34 Although practice provides ample 
examples of adequate evolutionary regulation, such as in the introduction of 
legal personality, even on a copy-paste basis (as with the many cases where 
existing bylaws and statutes are used as examples for new legal acts regulating 
new issues) we should be aware that this is particularly true for ‘tame policy 
problems’ (new rather than novel),35 where regulatory effectiveness and 
                                                        
32
  The term ‘de facto design’ comes to mind, but, apart from confusing terminology, using 
the term design here, would wrongfully suggest intent behind the instance/examples 
being copied. To use the term ‘novel’ instead of ‘new’, marks a distinction – with ‘novel’ 
understood as “new and not resembling something formerly known or used” (Merrian-
Webster online, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/novel>) – which of course 
increases doubts about copy-paste practises.  
33
  To speak of a sequence of changes/developments or sequential instances would too 
strongly suggest (functional and causally pursued) intent towards a specific outcome 
(involving a per se legal form relating to a regulatory function – see Para. 2.4). 
34
  Admittedly, ‘proof’ is a tough concept. Proof through testing of actual models of design 
is not unusual in the course of a design process. Building upon general knowledge of 
regulation channelling behaviour and thus producing desired outcomes will be relevant, 
but ‘evidence based’ design is desirable. These are especially issues of ‘regulatory 
impact assessment’. 
35
  See note 32. 
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legitimacy can (both) be achieved largely by applying existing instruments. 
Especially in this day and age of rapid (and increasingly entangled) societal and 
technological innovation, regulatory challenges concern ‘wicked policy 
problems’, where both effectiveness and legitimacy of regulation are challenged. 
Especially in such cases regulatory design is called for.36 
3.4 Methodology of Regulatory Design? 
 
When the term design is used here, it refers – departing from Ruiter’s wording – 
to well-considered, methodical attention to the specificity of the artefacts aimed 
to be created, building on an instrumental form and function relationship, and on 
the legal norms and factual circumstances which mark the particular scope for 
functional effectiveness and legitimacy.  
This methodical attention, rooted in a proper methodology of (regulatory) 
design, will entail regulatory design methods, which will (largely) consist of 
guidelines for making designs (which designs will hold guidelines for producing 
ad hoc instances of the design et cetera). Given the focus of this contribution, 
our attention is drawn especially to guidelines regarding the external validity of 
hybrid regulatory instruments. This follows from the assumption that in ‘pure’ 
(i.e. non-hybrid) regulation, the proper method of design is built into the ideal 
type characteristics of the instrument (‘design by origin’, if you will), yielding 
legal optimality in effectiveness and legitimacy, whereas it is not with hybrid 
regulation.37 Consequently, before actually formulating design-guidelines for 
hybrid regulation, we need be clear on what hybridity is about, so that we have a 
proper basis for research into their guidelines. Hence we must now return to 
regulation, with a focus on hybridity. 
                                                        
36
  For the original typology of tame and wicked policy problems see: H. Rittel, & M. 
Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, 1973, pp. 
155-169. Personally, wickedness in the face of technological innovation, has triggered 
my research into ‘smart rules and regimes’: M.A. Heldeweg, Legal Design of Smart 
Rules and Regimes: Regulating Innovation, in M.A. Heldeweg & Kica, E. (Eds.), 
Regulating Technological Innovation. A Multidisciplinary Approach, Hershey, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2011, pp. 37-52. 
37
  This assumption rests upon the premise that institutional environments present patterns 
of behaviour not only as an empirical fact, but also as normative (institutional) fact, 
which often relates to legal norms, rules and regimes. See: D.W.P. Ruiter, ‘Types of 
institutions as patterns of regulated behaviour’, Res Publica, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, pp. 
207-231. 
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4. Hybrid Regulation 
 
4.1  Hybridity in Law 
 
From a legal perspective (especially under civil law),38 hybridity will generally 
be explained in terms of core legal phenomena (such as norms, (regulatory) acts 
and organizations/legal persons) across the public law – private law divide. 
Public and private law then function as ‘ideal type’ legal areas or particular 
configurations of basic legal aspects, such as interests (e.g. private, societal, 
public), values & norms (e.g. autonomy, solidarity, non-discrimination, fair 
competition), legal institutions (e.g. property, statehood), legal persons (e.g. 
private persons, public offices, courts) and legal relations (and related activities; 
e.g. rule-making, contracting, management).  
Hybrids in law, as in legal regulations or in organizations with legal personality, 
will either combine such aspects in a way where the one aspect has a public law 
connotation (e.g. public interest) and the other has a private law connotation 
(e.g. bilateral/reciprocal legal relations), or where within one aspect, 
connotations of both areas are combined (e.g. a rule which calls upon regulatees, 
such as public service organisations, to compete amongst each other but also act 
in solidarity). 
The appropriateness of such hybrids (as a ‘best of both worlds’ instead of a 
‘toxic mix’)39 may be assessed in terms of their ability to successfully combine 
elements of public and private configurations to a form, which can, legally 
speaking, function both effectively (with desired legal consequences) and 
legitimately (with acceptance of its bindingness). Thus, upon proper design, a 
public enterprise, for example, is presumed to properly serve public interests, 
while operating as a private law type of legal person, guided by a (particular) 
mix of different or shared public and private law values. 
 
To apply this legal type of categorization makes sense when indeed a ‘mere’ 
legal assessment is called for, more particularly on legal validity and lawfulness 
of instances of regulation. It does, however, fall short of our analytical needs, 
when our aim is to provide a regulatory design perspective which more broadly 
addresses effectiveness as well as legitimacy, as a matter of regime choice, that 
                                                        
38
  Increasingly also under common law. See: F.J. van Ommeren & G.T.J.M. Jurgens, De 
opmars van het onderscheid tussen publiekrecht en privaatrecht in het Engelse recht. 
Vanuit rechtsvergelijkend perspectief, Den Haag, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2009; with 
a summary in English: The Rise of the Public-Private divide in English Law. 
39
  See J. Jacobs, Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce 
and Politics, New York, Vintage Books, 1994. 
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is: beyond the realm of existing, ‘positive law’ demands of legality and 
lawfulness.40 
 
Consequently, we should first further investigate how hybridity may be 
conceptualized from the broader perspective of regulatory governance, to 
subsequently consider possible approaches of regulatory (and, given legal 
relevance), legal design. Two approaches present themselves as interesting 
‘candidates’ for an understanding of hybridity as a departure from pure forms of 
regulation. 
4.2 Hybridity Following Regulatory Modalities 
 
The first candidate is presented by Murray and Scott and based upon their 
suggestions to improve on Lessig’s types of regulatory modalities – 
abovementioned, in Paragraph 2.2. As to their amendments regarding 
modalities,41 they argue that as a separate form of regulation, law as command is 
too suggestive of only including law as state law. In proposing the term 
‘hierarchical control’, they hope to redirect the scope to the form of control, 
rather than its source, and thus private control forms may also be included. With 
regard to social norms, Murray & Scott suggest the term community-based 
control, as this term reaches beyond the scope of standard setting (only), to the 
institutional regulatory environment, which also holds mechanisms of 
monitoring and enforcement (with social sanctions in the form of public 
criticism and ostracism).42 Both market and architecture are labels deemed 
under-inclusive, as Murray & Scott consider the alternatives of ‘competition-
based control’ (also including non-market governance and regulatory 
competition), and (perhaps somewhat confusing here) ‘design(-based control)’, 
also including the design of social and administrative systems in as much as 
capable of control in a way beyond regulatees’ influence – such as in-built 
administrative oversight.43  
 
                                                        
40
  Compare how Beetham defines legitimacy (of public authority) not only as a matter of 
legality, but also of fit with shared values and of consent. D. Beetham, The Legitimation 
of Power, Basingstoke, Basingstoke/Palgrave, 1991. 
41
  Supra, pp. 502-504. 
42
  These could relate to public and professional moral convictions, so one may wonder if 
personal moral convictions (as a strictly personal motivation), would be relevant – I lean 
to a negative position, unless these personal convictions lead to an expressed 
commitment to others, giving rise to (shared) expectations concerning behaviour.  
43
  As discussed, the case here is that all regulation benefits by a design-based approach, but 
that statement refers to the (methodologically proper) way of establishing outlines before 
making actual instances – rather than to (outlines and) instances that do not allow for 
regulatees’ influence on their normative substance. 
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On the basis of these ‘amendments’ to Lessig’s distinction of regulatory modes, 
Murray & Scott continue on Lessig’s argument, “[…]. that there is scope for the 
use of hybrid forms of regulation which link two or more of the ‘pure’ 
modalities of regulation […]”.44 This approach fits perfectly with my earlier 
remark on purity and hybridity as regards the public law – private law divide. In 
their description and analysis, Murray & Scott accentuate the kinds of hybrids 
that are of particular relevance to controlling cyberspace. Here we apply a more 
abstract approach, so that a simple, overall list of pure and hybrid forms 
suffices.45 
 
As pure forms Murray& Scott distinguished four modes: 
 
Singles 
1. Hierarchy-based regulation (‘Shall (not)’)46 
e.g. prohibition of criminal acts. 
2. Community-based regulation (‘Ought (not)’) 
e.g. NGO child-labour or eco-friendliness standards 
3. Competition-based regulation (‘Want (not)’) 
e.g. corporate social responsibility standards (labels) to create a niche 
market, e.g regulatory competition between states in attracting companies 
(see no. 6). 
4. Design-based regulation (‘Can (not)’) 
e.g. speed ramp, crush barriers, IP-addresses, regional dvd-codes. 
 
From this 6 pairs of hybrid modes, 4 threesomes of hybrid modes and 1 
foursome hybrid mode can be distinguished: 
 
  
                                                        
44
  Murray & Scott, supra, p. 504. 
45
  With each some examples are named, mostly taken from Murray & Scott, but some 
added on my own accord. 
46
  My, perhaps somewhat feeble, attempt is to typify distinctions by succinct descriptions 
as (varieties of) incentive-modes: shall – ought – want – can (not). 
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Hybrid pairs 
1. Hierarchy- & community-based regulation (‘Shall (not) & Ought(not)’)47 
e.g. public ‘co-regulation’ and ‘enforced self-regulation’, being community-
based and, if and when involving mechanisms of government mandates or 
approval, hierarchically based (but check no. 8). 
2. Hierarchy- & competition-based regulation (‘Shall (not) & Want (not)’) 
e.g. ‘partial industrial regulation’ – such as in auctioning of public 
rights/allowances – e.g. UMTS), being hierarchy-based, but leaning on a 
competition between regulatees.  
3. Hierarchy- & design-based regulation (‘Shall & Can (not)’) 
e.g. hard ‘enforced design’ (for products or services, including websites), 
when hierarchy-based following mandatory government regulation, such as 
a standard on in-built content scrambling or encryption against violation of 
copyrights (but also check no. 9). 
4. Community- & competition-based regulation (‘Ought (not) & Want (not)’) 
e.g. private ‘co-regulation’ and ‘enforced self-regulation’ (see no. 5; 
especially know as ), being community-based and, if and when involving 
mechanisms of negotiations between competitors, competition-based – at a 
risk of infringing competition law. 
5. Community- & design-based regulation (‘Ought (not) & Can (not)’) 
e.g. soft ‘enforced design’ (see no. 7), being community-based, following 
from private (e.g. industrial) self-regulation. 
6. Competition- & design-based regulation (‘Want (not) & Can (not)’) 
e.g. ‘standardized design’, being competition-based as first-mover designs 
of products (or infrastructure or semi-manufacture) become dominant if and 
when they are favoured by consumers, and next, second-mover competitors 
follow design to successfully and competitively enter the market.  
 
Hybrid threesomes 
1. Hierarchy- & community- & competition-based regulation (‘Shall (not) & 
Ought (not) & Want (not)’) 
e.g. government requirement of management or process certification by 
NGO, for industry (concerning tradable allowances'). 
2. Hierarchy- & community- & design-based regulation (‘Shall (not) & Ought 
(not) & Can (not)’) 
                                                        
47
  In this labelling the assumption is that each of the involved modes expresses the 
ultimately intended behavioural norm and that, if applicable, the ‘(not)’ expresses this 
norm. With more nuance, each of these hybrids combines two: hierarchy-community and 
community-hierarchy, in which case the second mode is primary object of the first (and 
not the behavioural norm itself): i.e. shall – ought (not) and ought – shall (not). The 
actual existence of each of these forms is not obvious and I have consequently refrained 
from analysing all their possibilities. 
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e.g. government requirement of service certification or benchmarking by 
NGO for NGO. 
3. Hierarchy- & competition-& design-based regulation (‘Shall (not) & Want 
(not) & Can (not)’) 
e.g. government requirement of product, infrastructure or physical 
production process certification by companies 
e.g. ‘architectured private property rights’, being community-based 
allocation and regulation of new property rights in a design context (as in 
new internet domains - e.g. ‘.aero’ and ‘.info’, but not ‘.xxx’) names) 
available in competition (to the highest/fastest bidder) The hierarchical 
aspect would be of a private nature, carried by ICANN. Alternatively, 
similar systems could exist on the basis of governmental hierarchy, as in 
public parking space. 
4. Community- & competition- & design-based regulation (‘Ought (not) & 
Want (not) & Can (not)’) 
e.g. self-regulatory service certification or benchmarking by NGO for NGO. 
 
Hybrid foursome 
1. Hierarchy- & community- & competition- & design-based regulation (‘Shall 
(not) & Ought (not) & Want (not) & Can (not)’) 
e.g. product certification or benchmarking by NGO for NGO. 
 
Murray & Scott only discuss full hybrids. In their analyses, three- and foursomes 
do not appear as partial hybrids that combine two or more instances of one mode 
with one or more instances of another, as in: hierarchy- & community- & 
hierarchy-based regulation and community- & competition- & community- & 
design-based regulation. I am under the impression that the authors’ main intent 
was to redefine control modes and to show accompanying examples in 
regulating cyber space.  
It would be a next step to determine the variety of hybrids in which there are 
particular sequences of control modes (related on a causal or a normative basis), 
in which case, for example, the above no. 6 theoretically involves two hybrid 
types: hierarchy-competition and competition-hierarchy, and in which case it 
makes sense to, generally speaking, also distinguish full and partial hybrids.  
Furthermore, hybridity may deepen as we break-up the three (or more) aspects 
of regulation – standard setting, monitoring and/or enforcement. In pure modes 
of control all of these aspects share the same ‘origin’ – of hierarchy, community, 
competition or design. Perhaps though, it is – for instance – possible to envisage 
a hierarchically established standard, which is enforced by community 
mechanisms (of criticism and ostracism). Not all of these may make practical 
sense (here and now), but theoretically we may expound our inventory and 
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analyses way beyond the 11 full hybrids, or 60 full hybrids with 
differentiated/non-random sequences – and beyond inclusion of 30 partial 
hybrids, or 264 partial hybrids if we include differentiated/non-random 
sequences. Together these make 340 combinations, and if we allow one or two 
aspects per option to break-up (or not), then we yield many, many more 
combinations.48 
 
So, starting with four pure modes of control-incentives, we yield many hybrid 
types, primarily by mixing modes, sequencing modes and meanwhile 
differentiating between three basic aspects of regulation. 
As we move from control incentives to regulatory sequences, from a design 
standpoint of external regulatory validity – both in being effective (capable) or 
legitimate (accepted),49 it becomes interesting to better understand sequences as: 
(a) types of relations between regulatory actors, including regulatees, holding 
certain positions and (b) considering the nature of these positions, if only as this 
nature, as standard practical reason, may reflect sensitivity particularly to certain 
modes of control incentives. In including these aspects (a and b) we can make 
good use of the analysis provided by Levi-Faur. 
4.3  Hybridity Following Regulatory Relations  
 
Levi-Faur’s angle in defining regulation was also motivated by the possibility to 
emphasize the importance of ‘diverse sets of actors’ in the regulatory process, 
especially to underscore the importance of hybridity in regulation.50  
 
These sets relate to the various ‘institutional environments’, notably that of 
government (featuring unilateral command in service of public interests), of civil 
society (as voluntary cooperation in service of shared interests) and of markets 
(as business transactions under competition in service of private interests), with 
                                                        
48
  To be exact, a staggering 238.343.500. On my website I have included a note, which I 
have produced together with T.T.R. Heldeweg, showing all possible varieties (in abstract 
terms – a, b, c, d for modes of control) for pure, full hybrid and partial hybrid 
combinations, and the math for determining all combinations including hybridity within 
modes. See: <http://www.utwente.nl/mb/pa/staff/heldeweg/> 
49
  The issue of internal design, as regards the choice and configuration of norm 
components, is likely to also become a challenge as in pair, three and foursomes, 
regulation will generally come as a conjunction of norms, which should be consistent 
across the various incentive modes upon which they are built. Of course this is not 
necessarily the case if standard setting is based in only one of two, three or four modes, 
involved in the particular piece of hybrid regulation. 
50
  Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 6. 
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types of regulation ‘purely’ within such environments, or ‘hybridly’, across 
these environments. 51 
Institutional environments have their own characteristic set of (institutive)52 
normative arrangements, such as that of property, contract, company and 
competition law concerning markets, democracy and the rule of law (e.g. 
legality) concerning government, and the freedom of association, legal 
personality and voluntary codes concerning civil society. Regulation is relevant 
to the introduction, change and termination of rules related to such 
arrangements. As such, they present themselves as matching regulatory 
environment(s), as described by Brownsword & Somsen. We should, however, 
not identify institutional and regulatory environments ‘one on one’. Firstly, 
because regulation is merely one of many institutional factors determining 
governance patterns of behaviour. Secondly, as regulatory environments are, 
consequential to the shift from ‘government regulation’ to ‘regulatory 
governance’, to a large extend contingent upon the occurrence and objectives of 
many different regulators applying various instruments to achieve different 
outcomes in various contexts – not necessarily bound by ideal type institutional 
prescripts.  
 
To make regulatory sense of actor operations within these entangled action 
contexts (or arena’s),53 we need to keep track of regulatory relations. To this, 
Levi-Faur provides a useful approach when linking the ‘who’, with the ‘how’ of 
regulation.54 This is captured in what he names major relational concepts of 
regulation, of which first, second and third party regulation are the major 
types.55 I understand these concepts as regulatory relations, between core 
                                                        
51
  Thinking of four modalities of regulation, it is tempting to also consider the concept of 
the institutional environment of the physical world, with patterns of behaviour which 
relate to the realm of physical functionalities, technologies and artefacts and which shape 
patterns of human activity – in as much as ‘architecture’ constitutes these patterns, rather 
than follows norms, so that ‘architecture’ can be said to, as an institutional environment, 
carry with it both an empirical and a normative dimension. I will not elaborate on this 
view. For some ‘roots’ for such a perspective see: L. Winner, Of Autonomous 
Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought, Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press, 1977.  
52
  Institutive is used loosely here, as generally institutional environments are momentary 
states of affairs in an evolutionary process of societal dynamics. Generally one cannot 
refer to a particular institutive act, which brings about such an environment.  
53
  E. Ostrom, ‘Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’, 
The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2011, pp. 7-28. 
54
  To focus on the ‘how’ (or act/strategy) of regulation, instead of the ‘who’ (actor), seems a 
logical consequence to the shift from government regulation to regulatory governance. 
‘We are all immersed in the regulatory game’, as Levi-Faur puts it (supra (2011), p. 7) 
and so, to merely look at the ‘who’ can only tell part of the story (and no longer the 
whole story as when looking at the ‘who’ of government sufficed).  
55
 Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 8. It is not clear to me which other strategies he would 
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functional actors in the regulation game, with each position in the relation 
carrying a specific function: (professional) regulators, regulatees and 
intermediary or supporting actors, such as standard setting, monitoring, auditing, 
and/or certification organizations. As to these latter actors Levi-Faur emphasizes 
their character as NGO’s established especially to develop and provide 
additional regulatory capacity: MaNGO’s, controlled by companies from within 
the market, GoNGO’s, controlled by governments, or CiNGO’s, controlled by 
societal organisations. The main argument behind using the NGO-label seems to 
be that it separates these specialized bodies from their controlling 
organisation(s). I find the NGO concept somewhat confusing here and rather 
refer to these actors by adding the ‘i’ of intermediary to the capital letter of their 
nature (G, C and M, for Government, Civil society, and Market): iG, iC, iM.56 
Their role will become clearer as we now look at the three basic types of 
regulatory relationships. 
 
In first party regulation there is no real specialization of concerned actors in 
terms of the role of regulator and that of regulatee, as both positions are 
occupied by one and the same actor, who is thus regulating itself: first party 
regulation is self-regulation.57 Given the three underlying institutional 
environments, we can distinguish between three (pure) subtypes, on the basis of 
related ideal type regulatory actors:  
1. a government (organization) regulating itself (G-G);  
2. a civil (society) organisation regulating itself (C-C);  
3. a market enterprise regulating itself (M-M). 
 
Across all of these, we may find service, product, and/or process quality 
standards, policy guidelines, ethical/integrity standards and governance codes. 
In all cases plurality of actors is possible, but only if consensus is the basis, as 
otherwise we enter into second party regulation. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
distinguish. Are there ‘fourth party’ strategies? 
56
 I understand the need to underscore the specialized character of these organizations, but 
remain somewhat sceptical as to separating them too much from their government, 
market or civil society roots – take credit rating agencies: they may be intermediaries but 
they are also companies wanting to make a profit… 
57
  The regulatee being the same as the regulator is to say that that the norm subject is equal 
to the regulator. Where a Constitution allocates power to municipalities to autonomously 
introduce bylaws on matters concerning the ‘household’ of the municipality, we have to 
look at the norm subjects of this bylaw to decide if this involves first or second (and 
perhaps third) party norm subjects If the norm subject is the municipality itself, we label 
the bylaw as first party regulation, if it concerns citizens, then we label it second party 
(or perhaps third – on which more later in the main text).  
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In second party regulation we do find the crucial ‘specialisation’ separating 
actors as regulators from actors as regulatees; the first being the one to 
introduce, change or terminate regulations, the second being the one actor 
(group) whose behaviour is channelled by these regulations (or channelled 
differently or no longer channelled). Given three underlying institutional 
environments, we can distinguish between nine subtypes, which I list, for the 
sake of brevity, as three groups of three relationships, again on the basis of 
related ideal type regulatory actors:58  
1. (1-3) A government can regulate another government or a civil organization 
or a market enterprise (G-G; G-C; G-M).  
2. (4-6) A civil society organization can regulate a government, or another 
civil organization or a market enterprise (C-G; C-C; C-M). 
3. (7-9) A company can regulate a government or a civil society organization 
or a market enterprise (M-G; M-C; M-M).  
 
With all of these nine relations, each actor type can refer to single or plural 
instances, and it is possible that regulators regulate more than one regulatee-type 
at the same time, as in a government regulation on fraud being applicable to 
governments, civil organisations and market enterprises at the same time  
(G-G∧C∧M). 
 
It is characteristic of modern regulatory governance that this list of second party 
regulation, especially looking at group 2 and 3 (no’s 4-9), includes relations 
where government is regulated by either market enterprises or civil 
organisations, and where market enterprises and civil organisations are 
regulating each other or others of their own kin. These latter relations (‘private 
to private’) may involve forms of voluntary regulation, such as market 
enterprises (as regulatees) adopting technical or social norms formulated by civil 
society regulators – which borders first party/self-regulation. They may, 
however, be of a (more) coercive nature, when based in private ownership or in 
(especially B2B) contracts under market conditions which leave the other 
contracting party (e.g. suppliers) little choice in accepting (retailer) conditions – 
something that has more elaborate third party forms – shown in the below. 
Note, finally, that of second party regulation, three types are about relations 
between the same type of organization (no’s 1, 5 and 9), and six types are about 
relations between different kinds of organisations. It is tempting to translate this 
in terms of pure versus hybrid, but we should look at third party regulation 
before we decide by what criterion we make this kind of judgement. 
 
                                                        
58
  And again, each actor type could refer to single or plural instances of such actors. 
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In third party regulation we find that, in between regulator and regulatees, a 
third party appears and fulfils a function indispensable to the proper working of 
the regulatory relationship. These are the intermediary or supportive regulatory 
agents, especially active in the field of auditing and certification.59 
Following Levi-Faur’s approach, there are twenty-seven subtypes of third party 
regulation, summarized in a table, linking each of three possible regulators to 
three possible intermediaries, and for each of these combinations to three 
possible regulatees. 
 
THIRD PARTY REGULATION (27 relations: 3x3x3) 
Regulator Intermediary Regulatee (choose between G, C and M)*/** 
 
G (Government) 
iG G (1) C (2) M (3) 
iC G (4) C (5) M (6) 
iM G (7) C (8) M (9) 
 
C (Civil Society) 
iG G (10) C (11) M (12) 
iC G (13) C (14) M (15) 
iM G (16) C (17) M (18) 
 
M (Market party) 
iG G (19) C (20) M (21) 
iC G (22) C (23) M (24) 
iM G (25) C (26) M (27) 
* G=Government; C=Civil Society; M=Market enterprise; iG, iC, iM as intermediaries 
controlled by G, C or M  
** (between brackets) the number of the specific relation: regulator-intermediary-regulatee 
 
Following Levi-Faur’s distinction between purity and hybridity by the nature of 
regulatory actors, there are three relations (No’s 1, 14 and 27) where all actors 
are of the same origin (in simple abbreviations: GiGG, CiCC, MiMM). 
Consequently, we are left with twenty-four relations as hybrids: 
• Six of these are full hybrids, in which every actor has another origin (i.e. 
GiCM; GiMC, CiGM, CiMG, MiCG, MiGC). These are interesting as their 
regulatory relation involves actors of different institutional denominations, 
causing legitimacy and effectiveness of regulation to hinge upon distinct 
actor characteristics – of regulators, intermediaries and regulatees – 
originating in their ideal type ‘practical reasons’ for acting, by regulating or 
under regulatory influence. Presumably, regulators opting for full hybridity 
do so on the assumption that the effectiveness and/or legitimacy of their 
regulatory intervention is best served by involving an intermediary from a 
different origin – either as this will ‘cloak’ their own involvement or add 
                                                        
59
  I lean to the position that we consider as third parties only those agents that have 
determining influence on the actual coding of signals, defining the scope of action 
available to regulatees, proving elements that the regulator has left to yet be decided – 
not merely enforcers or those who may support a change of behaviour but are not 
indispensable. 
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additional legitimacy and/or effectiveness through the intermediary’s 
involvement.  
• Next, there are three groups of six partial hybrids (so in all eighteen – no 
rocket science here), with the interesting feature of there always being ‘an 
odd one out’.  
- In one group, the regulator is the ‘odd one out’ (i.e. GiCC, GiMM, 
CiGG, CiMM, MiGG, MiCC), suggesting, as in the above group, that 
the regulator seeks regulatory support in an intermediary from the same 
origin as the regulatee – suggestive, perhaps, of facilitating some 
measure of self-regulation.  
- In another group, the intermediary is the ‘odd one out’ (i.e. GiCG, 
GiMG, CiGC, CiMC, MiGM, MiCM), perhaps suggesting impartiality 
to regulatees of the same origin as the regulator, or some other type of 
external legitimacy (presenting the different nature of the intermediary 
as a sign of external support of the regulation in case), or merely 
acquiring the regulatory capacity that is otherwise lacking. 
- In the last group, the regulatee is the ‘odd one out’ (i.e. GiGC, GiGM, 
CiCG, CiCM, MiMG, MiMC), presenting a strong case of suggesting 
that the regulator ‘means business’, by retaining the primacy over, what 
we could call, the ‘active side’ of regulation (i.e. of the regulator and the 
intermediary; as against the ‘passive side’, where the regulatees are 
placed), but possibly also to hold primacy, but meanwhile creating 
distance (and impartiality) from characteristic influences upon the 
regulator (e.g. political, market, stakeholder). 
 
From all of this it seems that Levi-Faur applies a ‘simple’ distinction between 
purity and hybridity: when all actors share the same origin, there is purity, if not, 
there is hybridity.  
Thus first party regulation is always pure, unless there is (de facto or de iure) 
involvement by other parties – as with coerced/enforced self-regulation or with 
co-regulation. I am assuming that Levi-Faur considers these hybrid only if they 
involve intrusion by a regulator of another nature, rather than there being a 
hybrid mix between first and second, or even third party regulation, regardless 
of the nature of actors involved.  
Following Levi-Faur’s approach, under second party regulation six out of a total 
of nine relations are hybrid, as their actor denominations do not match. Doing so 
certainly creates awareness of the fact that, often, regulatees do not share 
regulator origins and accompanying characteristics, such as organisational form 
and purpose, so that through regulation their ‘practical reason’ may be 
incentivized in different ways than peculiar to the regulator himself. At the same 
time, certain second party relations are well established as typical of particular 
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institutional environments, such as those of government regulation of citizens. 
Levi-Faur, however, does not in so many words single out these six hybrids.  
As we saw in the above, within third party regulation, twenty-four of the twenty-
seven third party relations are considered hybrid, again by virtue of the 
difference in nature of one or two or all of the actors involved. 
 
Apart from these twenty-four hybrids within third party regulation, Levi-Faur 
makes a general point about hybridity, by discussing four major types,60 
applicable to first and second party regulation – and perhaps also to third party 
regulation.61 These are: 
• Co-regulation, much alike self-regulation, the regulator/regulatee joins 
another regulator in bringing about regulation agreed between them. This 
agreement separates co-regulation from self-regulation as it is likely to 
involve compromise.62  
• Coerced regulation, although self-regulating, the regulator/regulatee is 
doing so under influence of another party with regulatory capacity (pushing 
ex ante substantive specifications and/or demanding ex post approval).  
• Meta-regulation, is about ‘any form of regulation […] that regulates any 
other form of regulation’63 It comes in various forms, such as (legal) 
regulation of self-regulation (e.g. oversight or voluntary accreditation of 
self-regulation or regulatory governance codes) and in transnational 
regulation (e.g. EU primary or secondary rules on member states’ 
regulation). When meta-regulation is understood as a regulator (as in second 
and third party regulation) facilitating and motivating regulatees to self-
regulate – setting aside whether the regulator is a public or a private actor – 
it presents a hybrid between different types of regulatory relations. Again 
this begs the question whether we should distinguish between hybridity as a 
mix of types of regulatory relations and hybridity as a relationship involving 
actors of different natures – maybe it is both. 
• Multi-level regulation, is about the possibility of regulators being situated at 
‘different levels of territorial tiers’64 – either on the basis of allocation 
driven by functional, hierarchical or incremental considerations. The core 
issue of multi-level regulation seems to be the transfer of regulatory 
authority between tiers,65 and in that sense it stands separate from meta-
                                                        
60
  Of course ‘major’ suggests that there are indeed more hybrids than Levi-Faur discusses. 
61
  Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 13. 
62
  Not necessarily only between ‘pure’ regulators; Levi-Faur points out that there may also 
be a sharing of regulatory work between MaNGO’s and CiNGO’s, or between MaNGO’s 
and Government. Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 10. 
63
  C. Parker, as quoted by Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 11.  
64
  Levi-Faur 2011, supra, p. 11. 
65
  Which separates it from meta-regulation. 
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regulation. Nevertheless, one can envisage multi-level regulation involving 
a shift in regulatory discretion from an actor within the dominant tier to one 
or more actors, self -regulating within a subordinate tier – so perhaps there 
is a (possible and partial) overlap of concepts. In any case, again one may 
wonder about the criterion for purity or hybridity: is multi-level regulation 
by definition (always) hybrid or only if it concerns regulators of different 
persuasions? 
 
As in some of the above four types of hybrids one can recognize some of the 
hybrid regulatory forms presented by Murray and Scott. However, the question 
remains whether this can be explained by reference to corresponding criteria for 
classification; either as pure or as hybrid types of regulation. Such classification 
may be vital to establishing guidelines for external validity of their design.  
5. Way forward: in Conclusion 
5.1 Pure & Hybrid 
 
In the above (Paragraph 4.1) I wrote that the distinction between purity and 
hybridity can be made in various ways, dependent on a particular focus, which 
presents a particular setting and/or particular characteristics as ideal type(s), 
such as that of public versus private law. This is the kind of approach that we 
find with Murray & Scott and with Levi-Faur, both with a different perspective 
on purity. 
 
Murray & Scott present purity and hybridity in the nature of modes of control, 
especially sanctions, but more broadly incentives. The nature of actors is 
relevant only in as much as this is indicative of their responsiveness to particular 
types of incentives. By combining four pure modes of regulation they presented 
eleven hybrid modes – across a variety of combinations across the aspects of 
standard setting, monitoring and enforcement. As we saw, this approach can 
easily be expanded upon with further refinement, as to specific sequences of 
modes and aspects, yielding up to 340 (or indeed 238.343.500) theoretical 
combinations (within the limit of only combining four modes). 
Levi-Faur focuses on actor types, with similarity of nature (based in market, 
civil society or government) being indicative of purity of regulatory form, and 
differences in nature leading to hybridity. Thus he demonstrates how modern 
day regulation involves actors from all kinds of persuasions, social, business and 
political actors, operating and interacting on the basis of different rationales and 
responding to different incentives. Hybridity of actor types across a regulatory 
relation requires, especially of (meta-) regulators and intermediary regulators, 
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that they are well aware of the diversity of interests, values, objectives, faculties, 
and expectations, influencing legitimacy and effectiveness of regulation. At the 
same time, Levi-Faur’s ordering of pure and hybrid regulation shows that purity 
and hybridity may also be regarded through the lens of the relationship itself, 
with hybrids being the consequence of mixtures between first and second party, 
second and third party and third and first party regulation.  
 
Against the backdrop of these approaches, the emphasis of the design challenge 
concerning hybrid regulation, would be on a given (or a to be established) 
specialisation in regulatory functions which need to show a fit across the 
regulatory relationship, facilitating standard setting, monitoring and enforcement 
and specialisation within these aspects – as instruments and incentives need to 
be consistently deployed. At the same time these functions need to properly 
align regulatory discretion of the regulator (and/or intermediary party) and 
behavioural susceptibility to regulation on the regulatees’ end of the 
relationship. As a matter of design this challenge resonates with the awareness 
that, following Brownsword & Somsen’s remarks, there is no such thing as the 
regulatory environment, as a single monochrome (or pure) normative template 
for behaviour. Hybridity in regulatory relations clearly points at the 
interrelations between regulatory forms. Proper design is no easy feat! 
5.2 The Design of Hybrids 
 
Given their differences in approach by Murray & Scott and Levi-Faur, there are 
clearly similarities between them, if only because of the types of regulation 
which are labelled hybrid in both appraisals, such as co-regulation and enforced 
regulation, and various kinds of third party regulation.  
 
What is clear is that although there may be ideal type combinations between 
institutional environments and organisations immersed in regulation, especially 
as regards incentive mechanisms that regulators call upon (hierarchy and 
unilateralism by governments; cooperation and consensus by civil organisations; 
competition and exchange by market enterprises), these combinations are by no 
means ironclad – in keeping with the shift from government to governance. 
Governments may apply hierarchy, but may also be involved in regulation by 
cooperation, contracts/exchange and competition. Similarly, civil organisations 
and market enterprises may use strategies or incentives other than typical to their 
ideal type origins of civil society (networks) and markets; such as command 
through ownership by civil society organisations and cooperation (legal or 
otherwise) by market enterprises in sharing resources. And in doing so, all actor 
types may also be involved in regulating by design. This means that as 
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regulators may ‘position’ themselves in ‘alien’ environments or, to phrase it 
somewhat less exotic, apply other than their own natural or ideal type incentive 
modes (i.e. other than unilateral commands by government, cooperation by 
social organisations and competitive contracts by market enterprises), so that 
regulatory strategies are mixed (and perhaps mixed up). Similarly intermediaries 
or regulatees may find themselves placed in other than their ideal type 
environment and accompanying ideal type relation to other regulatory actors. 
 
A similar perspective is possible as regards the deployment of different types of 
regulatory relations. Whereas second party regulation may be suggestive of 
hierarchical control, it is not necessarily government that is on the regulator end 
of the relationship. Similarly, first party regulation is not limited to civil society 
organisations and indeed in third party regulation we may find mixed 
combinations of actors, control modes and institutional environments involved. 
Given ideal type institutional environments, with characteristic configurations of 
control modes, actors and relations – manifesting as patterns of behaviour –, 
what we find is that all three components can be reconfigured in ways which 
give a profoundly different meaning to their functionality – taking on 
characteristics which by nature are orthogonal to them, typical of application in 
other ideal type environments, such as a public allowance becoming a property 
right which can be traded.  
 
When we focus on the position of regulators, this being ‘out of place’ as a 
regulatory actor, focuses attention to possible, what I name, ‘normative 
transaction costs’.66 My assumption, for which this contribution does only allow 
a brief description, is that ideal type alignment between a regulator and its 
institutional environment rests on the premise that this presents – by definition – 
the optimal match in its (balance of) effectiveness and legitimacy in performing 
regulatory activities. Moving away from this general optimum makes sense only 
if this provides regulators with ad hoc opportunities that could not be realized 
within their ideal typical scope and which are expected to outweigh negative 
impacts from normative transaction costs. These are costs in being less effective 
or legitimate than on ideal type balance. Such loss of effectiveness (e.g. a 
government not being able to unilaterally decide and/or having to compromise) 
or of legitimacy (e.g. a company using its market power to enforce its quality 
                                                        
66
  This is a label of my own device, but of course leaning on the concept of transaction 
costs as used by O.E. Williamson (and others). The adjective ‘normative’ does not 
exclude the possibility of real costs, i.e. with monetary consequence – see also the next 
footnote. 
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standards over suppliers), is then traded off against expected reciprocal ad hoc 
gains in legitimacy and effectiveness respectively.67  
Of course, the ideal type institutional environments are not merely 
recommended optimum normative types of states of affairs, but they will also 
come with normative demands and constraints, which present boundary rules for 
certain regulatory ‘transpositions’ – as in competitors freely regulating markets 
cooperatively (i.e. cartels) or in governments regulating for the mere benefit of 
private business persons of volunteers (i.e. favouritism, nepotism etc.), apart 
from restricting aspects of legal personality and of allocation of legal powers.68 
Thus to merely consider hybrid regulatory transpositions as clever, yet neutral 
remediable responses69 (i.e. without normative consequence) to institutional 
failure of markets, civil society, or government, in meeting certain regulatory 
ends, would not do justice to the normative standing enshrined in the typical 
normative balance they strike between effective and legitimate (regulatory) 
interactions.  
5.3 Finally 
 
This contribution’s objective is to set a first step in understanding and mapping 
hybridity of regulation and understanding that it impacts external validity as a 
parameter of proper legal design of the rules and/or regimes that establish such 
regulation.  
 
We have found firstly that the shift from government to governance has 
broadened the scope of regulation and increased the number and measure of 
entanglement of regulatory environments, actors and activities. With this, 
regulatory environments have developed not only within, but also across the 
institutional environments of markets, civil networks and government.  
 
Secondly, the case was made that modern day wicked policy challenges call for 
a proper methodology of legal design regarding regulatory instruments to secure 
and foster their effectiveness and legitimacy. Such a methodology builds upon 
an understanding of legal design as well-considered relationships between legal 
form and legal functionality, expressed by procedural and substantive guidelines 
                                                        
67
  Think also of costs of organising oversight for market enterprises involved in taking 
decisions with public authority. 
68
  In a manner of speaking, making systemic transaction costs absolutely unaffordable, as 
their prohibitive causes are beyond compensation. 
69
  Compare the concept of ‘remediableness’ as suggested by O.E. Williamson, The 
Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, p. 210 (“The 
relevant test is whether (1) an alternative can be described that (2) can be implemented 
with (3) expected net gains. This is the remediableness criterion.”) 
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for design. Such form-function relationships are relevant, firstly, to the internal 
norm structure of regulation (concerning the configuration of norm subject, 
object, operator and condition),70 but also the external validity of regulatory 
instruments. This is regarded a challenge especially to hybrid regulation as their 
method of design does not follow from some ideal type concept of regulatory 
instruments, given institutionalized patterns of behaviour. 
Thirdly, an attempt was made to understand and map some likely candidates for 
conceptualisation of such pure and, especially, hybrid forms of regulation, based 
on different perspectives: of ‘modes of control’, of ‘types of actors’ and of 
‘regulatory relations’. Even with the modest exploration performed in this 
contribution, the number and variety of hybrids is, well, ‘staggering’. 
Furthermore, it has become clear that from a design standpoint we need to 
clearly determine the functionality of regulatory types in context. If we accept 
the premise of ideal type institutional environments with, as to their external 
legal validity (in being effective and legitimate), intrinsic design methodologies, 
then the search for design guidelines could be undertaken by comparing 
normative transaction costs. Thus designed, hybridity may be understood as a 
well-considered choice of regulation away from general optimality, towards ad 
hoc optimality, enhancing regulatory effectiveness and legitimacy while 
minimising normative transaction costs.71 
                                                        
70
  Which we may understand as a general notion of setting standards for behaviour, but 
includes the issues of standards for standard setting, for monitoring and for sanctioning, 
and the powers to set standards, to monitor and to sanction. 
71
  I wish to thank my colleagues Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi (Groningen University, Faculty 
of Law) and Richard Neerhof (VU University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law) for their 
very useful comments to an earlier version of this text.  
